

Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

With the end of the Cold War, America faces a different world, one that from a political, military, and economic perspective is far more complex. The interests of the United States have never been more global, more interdependent with those of other nations and peoples, and there are risks to these interests throughout the world. Where America's relationships with the various regions of the world were once subordinated to and conditioned by the superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union, the regions are now becoming important actors in their own right. Within these regions, it might be added, certain countries are emerging as centers of estimable military power. These developments—which I will refer to as regionalism—are changing the power relationships between the United States and the rest of the world. Such ferment is not necessarily bad. For states or groups of states to pursue their national interests within the norms of accepted international behavior is to be welcomed and encouraged. On the other hand, the rise of hostile powers that could dominate various regions would be an unwelcome development so far as America's interests are concerned.

America's post-Cold War national military strategy recognizes the evolving power relationships within this new geostrategic environment. The elements of the strategy—strategic deterrence and defense (maintenance of a sizable nuclear and conventional stateside reserve), forward presence (discriminate overseas representation as opposed to large standing deployments), crisis response (appropriate reaction in any exigency), and reconstitution (mobilization in the face of a global threat)—address the need for a broad, flexible capability to answer not only expected threats but those presently unforeseen.

This national military strategy is creating demands for a new kind of United States Army. It requires something far different than simply a down-sized version of the Army that successfully deterred Soviet aggression. Since

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Vietnam we have made the Army the best land combat force in the world, and we can be proud of that accomplishment. Certainly that force serves as a superb foundation for shaping the Army of the future. But change we must. The particular conditions we find in the world today require us to make specific adjustments in roles and missions, force structure, training and leader development, and doctrine.

In this article I shall give my perspective of the challenges that regionalism poses for our nation's security strategy and the capabilities required by the Army in support of that strategy. These capabilities address the full range of military endeavor—from operations other than war (nation assistance, counterdrug, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-terrorism, counterinsurgency, domestic assistance, etc.) to actual war in all its phases (mobilization, deployment, operations, conflict termination, etc.). It should be noted that domestic assistance, where the armed forces are used to service the civilian sector, is a traditional mission going back to the early days of the republic when soldier Zebulon Pike explored the West, and to the early days of this century when soldier George Washington Goethals built the Panama Canal. The Army's main focus must remain on fighting and winning the nation's wars, that is true. But in the new environment there is a growing role for our military in peacetime security activities that will go a long way toward precluding hostilities or bringing about their rapid and decisive conclusion if they cannot be prevented.

The Challenges of Regionalism

Since taking up my duties as Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 1991, I have traveled to virtually all the far-flung theaters and regions of the world, and I've been amazed at the degree of change—political, economic, and social—that has been wrought in these two short years. This is especially true in Europe, where I spent a good portion of my early career and am able to gauge personally the rapidity of developments. The struggle to establish new governments and adapt to democracy in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by the reemergence of traditional ethnic and religious animosities. Accompanying this

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political and cultural unrest has been enormous economic dislocation. With the artificial glue provided by the Warsaw Pact now suddenly dissolved, states of the region are free to express their own intrinsic individuality and historical imperatives. Not surprisingly, intense competition in matters of economic and geographic security is resulting.

Democracy is also trying to take hold outside of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a similar pattern of age-old animosities and competition is producing conflict as well. There is the obvious example of Somalia, where government has collapsed and gang violence and survival politics are the rule of the day. There are others, like Peru, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where, though government is intact, the growth of democratic institutions faces staggering challenges nonetheless. The Cold War order of nations is thus disintegrating and assuming new forms. This new order and the changed relations between countries engendered thereby call for a rethinking of vital US interests and how we can best exert influence to further those interests.

But we must be careful as we forge ahead. We do not know whether the trends we see today will continue. We simply cannot predict the ultimate course of the winds of change nor can our uniquely tolerant American view of human intercourse easily fathom the bewildering ferocity and complexity of ethnic and religious conflict. Our euphoria over the triumph of democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been tempered by the realities of Yugoslavia and the emergence of fascist nationalist organizations and political parties. Our policies and actions must thus be tempered by a high degree of contingency and prudence.

We cannot wish away historical enmities or naively assume they will not resurface. Neither can we assume that military intervention will necessarily lead to the peace and stability we seek. Unfortunately, relations between regional actors will not always be governed by the rationality of a common reverence for democracy. Rather, the struggle for regional ascendancy, defined in terms of political, ethnic, religious, economic, and military factors, will often be the dominant imperative. While these developments may seem quite removed from us today, the close interdependence of events everywhere means that such developments can pose significant danger to America's regional interests and to the broader interests of world peace and stability. However, we also must accept the fact that, in some instances, our ability to influence regional events through military power may be frustratingly limited.

To add to our concerns, there is the increasing international awareness of "environmental" problems. Under this rubric are such issues as disease control, industrial pollution, wildlife and plant extinctions, and global warming. While each of these may affect a given country disproportionately, most are transnational in character. Many countries, including the United States,

are beginning to understand that environmental problems are security threats just as much as hostile armed states or organizations, which further complicates the national security equation.

Confronted with this evolving regionalism, the United States Army is energetically reexamining the way it does business in the various regions of the world and will be ready to respond when the nation calls. In this context, let me share some of my thoughts on each of the major regions.

Europe and the Former Soviet Union

With the end of the Cold War, there is a great temptation to conclude that the requirement to keep forces in Europe no longer exists. After all, the threat of a ground invasion of Western Europe by a rejuvenated Warsaw Pact or even a residual threat from Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States is now a distinct improbability. However, the very developments that have caused some to favor a removal of US forces from Europe may make the most compelling argument for their retention there.

As we have seen, the shattering of the rigid framework of the Soviet Empire has created a potentially dangerous instability. For example, consider the disagreement between Ukraine and Russia over control and disposition of nuclear weapons stored on Ukrainian territory. Given the problematic control of those strategic nuclear weapons, it is vital to the security interests of the United States that strong democratic governments emerge in these areas. Additionally, the ethnic and religious tensions that have turned to bloody and tragic violence in Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and other areas continue to be dangerously unsettling factors.

Throughout this transition, the nations in the region have been seeking varying degrees of contact with the West. In many instances, military-to-military contact has provided the first tangible interaction. The stability and security represented by the West on a political and economic level are of course epitomized by NATO. Not surprisingly, many of the nations in this region have expressed interest in becoming members of NATO or of some future pan-European security organization. Today Russian and other Eastern European officers participate in exchanges with the US Army War College and the Army's Command and General Staff College. The US Army Russian Institute is being expanded into the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, which will focus on strengthening civil-military relations in the former Warsaw Pact countries. We are helping them learn not only what it means for an army to be responsible to democratic institutions in a free society, but more important what it means to be democracy's guardian.

US forces, as the linchpin of NATO, are essential for providing stability and continuity as the Atlantic community transitions to a new security framework. NATO provides an anchor of stability and security as the various

members of the new Europe sort out what their security relationships will be. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States provides a degree of escalation control and deterrence simply by maintaining a credible force in Europe.

Nevertheless, we have to recognize that the forces at work in the wake of the Cold War are causing fundamental alliance realignments. The commencement of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 20 December 1991 provides a good example. Under the aegis of NATO, the council gives formal structure to the growing links between the Western alliance and the former Soviet bloc, including the three Baltic states. Further, the Western European Union, possibly expanded from its present membership of nine states, will figure importantly in the emergence of a new European security order, one likely role being to serve as a link between NATO and the European Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, though unwieldy by virtue of having 51 member states, promises to continue development of its peace-maintenance roles.

Southwest Asia

America's involvement with the Middle East has been a key aspect of our foreign policy for almost 50 years, and the Persian Gulf War has given an added dimension to that policy. Moreover, the spinoff effects—resurrection of the Arab-Israeli peace talks; military training and prepositioning of equipment in Kuwait; humanitarian assistance/protection operations; monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions; and the resurgence of Iran—will continue to dictate some level of American military presence in the region. The changing power relationships in the region and the pressures for increased democracy and civil rights create a less stable environment than we would prefer.

The Middle East well illustrates the global reverberations of regional issues—in this case, energy and religion. The action of Islamic states in the former Soviet Union may be influenced by the militant Islamic fundamentalism of Iran. At the same time, Islamic but non-Arab Turkey, a member of NATO, is bordered by Islamic states that are either unfriendly or unstable. The vexing Kurdish issue continues to plague the Turks in their southeastern provinces. Economically, the region will remain of great importance to other regions of the world—particularly the West—because of their dependence on its energy resources.

India/Pakistan

Next to the changing geostrategic environment in Europe, the situation in the Asian subcontinent is probably the most typical of the challenges that regional developments will present to the United States. Pakistan, having

common borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and India, and proximity to the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union, is a key state in the region. Its conflict with India over Kashmir, while not resulting in major fighting in recent years, remains a source of tension. Though Pakistan has been a long-time US ally, we have discontinued military aid because of congressional concerns about Pakistan's military nuclear program.

India's burgeoning population, which threatens to surpass that of China in the near future, is a diverse mix of races and religions creating severe internal strains. National fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines is an explosive trend in a nation such as India, despite its relative commitment to pluralistic democracy—witness, for example, the Hindu-Sikh violence involving riots and destruction of mosques and temples, the recent fundamentalist Hindu demonstrations in New Delhi, and the wave of deadly bombings. Moreover, India's size, resources, and increasing ability to project military power in the Indian Ocean are creating apprehension among its neighbors. Our concern in the region is compounded by the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the case of India and Pakistan, which is likely to continue to constrain our interaction and influence at the military level.

Pacific Rim/Southeast Asia

Because of North Korea's continued militancy and its repeated refusals to cooperate on nuclear weapons inspections, Northwest Asia is one region in the world where we face a significant threat to peace. While there has been some progress in improving bilateral relations between the two Koreas, it remains to be seen what North Korea's real objectives are, since it refuses to take the most elementary steps to reduce military tensions. In fact, North Korea's declaration of intent to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty was a dangerous step in the opposite direction. It is unreasonable to assume that any meaningful moves toward disarmament will occur before the resolution of the leadership succession in North Korea. Consequently, the United States must retain a significant ground combat capability on the Korean peninsula.

China retains the potential to become the dominant regional actor in military, economic, and diplomatic terms. The Chinese face significant internal pressures for change while at the same time confronting discomfiting political ferment along its borders—everything from the radical devolution of independence upon the republics of the former Soviet Union to the more measured, yet no less historic, progress toward assimilation of Hong Kong. Moreover, despite some overtures with Taiwan, the prospects for reconciliation or affiliation remain distant at best.

Equally unclear is the shape of Japan's defense policy in the years ahead. Japan has taken the first fledgling steps in Cambodia to involve its military forces in international peacekeeping activities. While it is far too

early to make much of this, it is demonstrative of the types of changes that are beginning to dot the strategic landscape in the region. However, just as in Europe, we cannot let the appearance of normalcy in this area overshadow the very real historical quarrels and mistrust existing among the three major competing regional actors—China, Korea, and Japan.

Southeast Asia is a hodgepodge of the old, the new, and question marks. Our relations with Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand will probably change little over the next few years. We have positive new relationships evolving with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. As we consider our strategy of power projection and coalition operations, these nations could play a significant role. At the same time, despite our long-standing good relations with the Philippines, the figurative winds of change—helped along by a literal volcano—have made our future connection with that developing country somewhat problematic. Immediately to the west, we are expanding diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam. Finally, in another instance of how our military is responding more and more to the world's trouble spots under the umbrella of the UN and other international organizations, we are contributing modestly to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.

Africa

The African continent is the setting for what is potentially the greatest tragedy facing the world community. Daily we are engulfed by media images of emaciated populations living in unimaginable misery. Such conditions prompt calls for multinational—or, failing that, unilateral—military action to ensure safe havens for populations and relief workers, and to create an environment in which the restoration of normal political intercourse can occur. Somalia provides a graphic example. Elsewhere, equally tragic, though less visible, events are unfolding. Ecological disaster resulting from natural and man-induced factors looms on a scale that may become irreversible. The refugee problem has reached almost unmanageable proportions and threatens political stability in some countries. By various estimates, there may already be ten million children in Africa orphaned because of war, famine, and disease. AIDS is a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions in Africa. In some countries there, the population between the ages of 20 and 40 is being decimated by the disease. With only children and old people left, African society could take decades to recover. In the interim, it would probably fall farther and farther behind the industrialized societies and even other Third World regions.

This widening gap, exacerbated by low education levels, will create the climate for instability and revolution in which democracy will have great difficulty taking hold. Whether in a humanitarian role or in response to revolutionary violence, international military action will increasingly become



DOD Joint Combat Camera Center, USAF TSG H. H. Deffner

Soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, man their M-60 machine gun during a combined US-Canadian assault to seize the Belet Uen airfield in Somalia, part of Operation Restore Hope.

the remedy of choice. However, even with the demonstrated ability of the military to provide solutions where all else fails, the magnitude of the crises may well exceed our capacity to mitigate them.

Latin America

Closer to home, the prospects are somewhat brighter. The trend toward democracy remains strong but must overcome two major roadblocks: economic disparity and narco-terrorism. We are already deeply involved in addressing the latter. New trade agreements such as that among the United States, Canada, and Mexico signal the effort of Western Hemisphere countries to generate a widening economic prosperity that will undercut the monetary lure offered by the drug traffickers and strengthen democracy at the same time. It will be in our interest to enhance the internal security of nations in this region to combat the threat posed by revolutionaries and drug cartels, but we must do so in conjunction with a broader strategy that fosters the emergence of democratic institutions over the longer term. In most countries of this region, national armies have undergone remarkable changes, becoming far more positive forces in society than in the past. The US Army through its army-to-army contacts is proud of its contribution to that evolution.

Implications for the Army

From the foregoing regional survey, three important implications for the Army emerge. First, the result of such wholesale political metamorphoses may well be a change in the way we define regions. The traditional geo-strategic approach is already beginning to give way to groupings of nations based upon other considerations such as economic, trade, or technological ties. One such organization, for example, is the Group of 7 (G-7), composed of the seven major non-communist economic powers from around the entire globe. Another is the European Economic Community. Along with the realignment will come new power relationships that could present significant challenges to American interests. The ultimate configuration of the evolving security, political, and economic organizations among nations is impossible to foretell, but as the Cold War dichotomy disintegrates and old national antagonisms wane, the resulting realignments will certainly present new problems—and new opportunities—to US security planners. These factors provide the broad framework for determining the Army's role in meeting the problems posed by post-Cold War regionalism.

Second, each region of the world has specific requirements and challenges that will condition our training and preparation. We cannot hope to project power successfully into a region of the world that we do not know or for which we have not adequately prepared. We are confident, however, that we understand the nature of the challenges and their complexity and that we are trained and organized to accomplish our mission in concert with the other services. The main reason for this confidence is that we have a generation of leaders who are committed to our nation and its values, and who have the skills to adjust quickly to a rapidly changing and uncertain world. The Army is more than military forces. It is an institution that understands the dynamics of national power and the ultimate importance of projecting not only force but ideals.

Third, the shift to regionalism dictates that the United States have a trained and ready power-projection Army to execute the national military strategy in support of America's domestic and global interests. The Army prepares itself to respond to crises through hard readiness training and by conducting a variety of overseas exercises and operations. The Army's capability to generate power derives from its composition as a Total Force, that is, an integrated structure incorporating all components—active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian. Such a force is trained and ready, serving the nation at home and abroad, and capable of decisive victory. The American people have every right to expect the Army to respond successfully to whatever missions are assigned—missions that are becoming increasingly difficult to forecast.

To be successful in the post-Cold War world, the United States must be capable of applying its power directly at the scene of the problem. The complementary capabilities of all the military services provide a degree of

strategic flexibility in catapulting forces to the far reaches of the globe that no other nation can achieve. Victory comes from the artful integration of the capabilities of the joint services, and we must resist the siren's call of single-service capability. Owing to complete joint doctrinal integration and firm mutual support obligations, we have long passed the day when individual services could think of going it alone.

Today, the Army contributes to the effectiveness of our nation's responsiveness by maintaining versatile forces organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the entire spectrum of war and operations other than war. The combination of active and reserve components provides the Army with the *unique* capability to tailor the correct force to respond to a given contingency. The Army provides support adjuncts to the joint force which, though often overlooked by both analysts and the public, are in fact indispensable to credible power projection. It is the Army, for example, that furnishes the military police, medevac and medical, communications, intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operations support for the joint force. The Army is the sole provider of the theater logistics command and control and infrastructure. All these seemingly mundane functions are what actually enables a force to sustain itself, survive, and operate in an overseas theater. Moreover, the Army provides the bulk not only of active but of mobilized manpower. The Army is the glue that binds the joint force together. For after all, it is the commitment of ground force on the decisive terrain that finally resolves the contest of wills we call war.

Let us glance now at how the Army's unique status as a sustainable power-projection force contributes to each of the elements of our national military strategy.

Providing Crisis Response

Our primary concern as a power-projection Army is that we are capable of the appropriate response during crisis. For American military power to be relevant we have to be able to put our young men and women anywhere on the globe, and do so rapidly. The Army is committed to meeting the requirement to deploy three divisions anywhere in the world in 30 days and the remainder of a corps in 75 days. But we cannot do it alone; we need airlift, sealift, and adequate port facilities.

The Army will have to be prepared to deliver a correctly sized and tailored package of forces, along with those of friends and allies, that enables us to bring a crisis under control and deliver decisive results consistent with political objectives. This includes countering military threats across the continuum of conflict as well as accomplishing humanitarian relief and disaster assistance missions. For example, the operation against Iraq contrasts markedly with that of providing aid to the starving in Somalia or to the victims of Hurricane Andrew in Florida. What each operation had in common was the

flexibility to task-organize the force while the operation was in progress. Deployments such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia may become routine, perhaps requiring fewer combat formations but far more support units and infrastructure—the type of support that is the Army's forte. In this regard, the Reserve and National Guard will have a key role. Much of our combat support and service structure resides in the reserve components. These units will have to be ready to respond rapidly, in some scenarios being among the first units to deploy.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will probably be under the auspices of an international organization such as the United Nations, but in some instances we may have to act unilaterally, at least initially. Even though such operations are undertaken for benign reasons and without warlike intent, they may expose our forces to hostilities. Our soldiers therefore must be trained to operate in an environment that looks like war but in which we do not want to become a belligerent. The situation that has prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina poignantly illustrates this point: it is difficult to imagine a scenario involving the introduction of US combat forces in that beleaguered land where they would not likely become combat-engaged. We must recognize that whenever and wherever we commit ground force we have crossed a unique threshold signaling a high level of commitment and national will. Inherent to the use of military formations—even in seemingly noncombat situations—is a coercive message that we are prepared to employ combat power. As we consider the variety of “noncombat” missions that regional conflicts and crises will present, we must think in terms of streamlined formations that can respond quickly, perform peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance, and still be credible warfighters.

Finally, the American people will turn to the armed forces—the Army in particular—to handle domestic crises, whether they be civil disturbance or disaster relief. The primary role of the National Guard in accomplishing these types of missions is an essential and uniquely American aspect of our Army. The active component, of course, has a responsibility to assist as directed when the circumstances or magnitude of the crisis exceeds the Guard's capacity. An important point needs to be underscored in this regard: a disciplined warfighting organization is inherently capable because of its administrative and logistical expertise to accomplish many peripheral missions, but the reverse is not true. We cannot organize primarily to accomplish humanitarian relief and disaster assistance and then be capable of winning decisively on the battlefield.

Redefining Forward Presence

As part of joint and coalition forces, the Army will maintain its carefully calibrated degree of presence around the world to support our strategy. However, in a fundamental change, the Army will sustain its forward presence from the continental United States rather than from Europe. This

reliance on US-based forces, deployed overseas for circumscribed periods as necessary, will make them more flexibly available for broad regional missions anywhere in the world. At the same time, increased training deployments, particularly in coalition contexts, will enhance our readiness to operate in the highly contingent environments likely to face us in the future. The training gained from years of NATO exercises such as Reforger paid great dividends in the Gulf War, as did our foreign military sales and military education and training programs in behalf of the Gulf states.

The new reliance on projecting a forward presence on an ad hoc basis does not mean the end of major ground forces stationed in Germany and Korea. On the contrary, some measure of forces will probably be required in those locations indefinitely. Forward presence, however, complements and extends the forward defense principle by husbanding a versatile and powerful force, centrally located stateside, having the flexibility to respond quickly anywhere on the globe to perform any mission. A flexible force demands soldiers with multifaceted skills. Along with combat competencies, for example, we will need to make our soldiers and leaders more adept in their foreign language specialties as they respond to international peacekeeping missions. Our reserve components will be able to contribute particularly to this element of the strategy.

Forward presence can assume still other forms. Foreign area officers, exchange officers, training exchanges, military assistance, civic action, and humanitarian relief operations should be effective forms of Army presence in many regions of the world. Over the past year, we have witnessed a steady increase in operational deployments overseas. On any given day, not counting our forces in Germany and Korea, we now have, on the average, 20,000 Army personnel deployed in over 50 nations. These soldiers are building roads, supporting international organizations, attending foreign civilian and military schools, and participating in many other constructive activities. We can thereby share our experience on how to form institutions, develop leadership, and establish policies and programs for operating within a democratic governmental framework. For most Third World nations their army is the core of the defense establishment; America's ability to influence their military community therefore usually rests on army-to-army contacts. We also need to think in terms of joint service ventures to achieve the most effective forward presence for a given region, ensuring that such activities complement actions by other governmental, allied, and international organizations.

Power Projection as Underpinning for Strategic Deterrence

While the United States will retain strategic nuclear weapons as a counter to potential nuclear threats, the strategic emphasis has shifted to joint conventional force capabilities. We must project whatever power our national

military strategy requires. The Army is, of course, the core of America's strategic forces, and having the ability to project credible land combat force aids deterrence. Only the Army can literally seize the enemy and control his land and his population.

The previously mentioned George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located in Garmisch, Germany, contributes both to maintaining a forward presence and to achieving strategic deterrence and defense. The center will help train civilians from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in how to integrate and manage defense establishments within the context of emerging democratic institutions. The Department of the Army, because of its experience in training foreign area officers, will play a significant role in supporting the center. The Army will in this way help address the serious strategic security concern of the United States about the future of democracy in the former Soviet Union.

The Army also has a role in key strategic weapon programs. The duel between the Army's Patriots and the Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf War illustrates the importance of theater missile defense to the nation. In a world with growing proliferation of missile systems and the concomitant threat of nuclear and chemical munitions, the Army's missile defense capabilities become critical. Moreover, just as the Army has a central role in the use of arms, it has significant responsibility in the control of arms. For example, the Army has been responsible for the destruction of US chemical munitions and provides numerous Russian area specialists to help monitor nuclear arms treaties.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the United States through the judicious and timely commitment of force can often put a damper on the escalation of hostilities, thereby contributing to stability and preempting aggression in problematic regions. In this connection, having the right forces and the capability to tailor discrete force packages is mandatory. These features are, as we have seen, the Army's strong suit. In today's world, even small force commitments at the right moment can have strategic impact and therefore must be packaged carefully.

Generating New Power-Projection Forces

The Army is the key player in generating additional force structure when the active force is insufficient to meet the contingency at hand. This reconstitution capability gives us the luxury of maintaining a relatively austere base force during peacetime along with the flexibility to expand if necessary. The Army's reconstitution capability—that is, mobilizing beyond peacetime demands in the event of a large-scale crisis—is necessary if we are going to have depth on the bench to react to sudden new demands on the team. Our reserve components address the manpower aspect of reconstitution, but

there are other essential aspects as well, such as a continuing robust R&D program and an industrial mobilization plan that includes provisions for restarting war materiel assembly lines.

In reconstituting, we should not think in terms of replicating the Cold War force structure. Regional struggles require a military different from the nuclear and conventional force designed specifically to engage the well-studied, doctrinally predictable, homogeneously equipped military colossus of the Soviet bloc. Rather, we must now think in terms of flexible forces able to respond to the infinitely variable military challenges encompassed by the strategy of regionalism.

The potential for an aggressor state or coalition to threaten our regional interests and even to become a global threat is quite real. Conventional forces, as we saw in the case of Iraq's arsenal, may be a shield for the development of more dangerous capabilities. Thus reconstitution capability will be every bit as important under a regionalist strategy as it was during the Cold War. Of course, reconstitution can never take the place of a trained and ready Total Force in place. Our ability to achieve our national security objectives depends on having a force today, both active and reserve, sufficient to the tasks we anticipate based on historical experience and a prudent reading of the political, ethnic, religious, and economic tensions in the developing world. Reconstitution capability alone—in the absence of a forward presence and ready crisis response forces—would have little deterrent effect upon the calculations of would-be adversaries. In this world of ours, actions do indeed speak louder than words.

Conclusion

Those who would rejoice over the end of the Cold War, feeling that arms and wars are suddenly out of fashion, must be emphatically reminded that history did not begin with the Cold War's demise. Over 30 centuries of state conflict preceded the Cold War, and only the historically naive would assume that human nature has suddenly been purged of its bent for violence. As Plato reminds, "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

The US Army has a real stake in the global search for peace and is committed to supporting those international political structures designed to preserve amity among nations. But while we hope and work for the best, we must be prepared for the worst. Today the worst is no longer the great bipolar confrontation of the Cold War era, but rather the eruption of regional conflict whose ripple effects can threaten our security in ways that, while perhaps less spectacular, are no less injurious in the long run. The Army, as the nation's principal instrument for the projection of carefully modulated military force, will continue to adapt its doctrine and force structure to the evolving geostrategic realities. □